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DECLASSIFIED Authority State Leher Yahz by me NARS Date 2458 thereafter, but most observers hope that they can be hela to local disturbances. Since the Cortés faction does not have Recess to any large supply of arms, it is diffioult to see how its supporters can attempt any armed violence on a large scale.
The administration is fearful lest the Cortés party obtain support from General Ubiso, who, it is well krowa, rogers endole association with the torner Communist party with conploto disapproval. Emissarios of Cortés are now in Guatemala or or route thoro, and the situation is being alosely watehod by the administration. President Calderon Guardia still feels that he wan rely on his friendship with General Somoza of Mioara cus in the event ho should need it, but in the interview which the two Presidents solebrated on January 14, it is. rolially Foported that Semoze did not give an especially convinelag usaurange of help. On the contrary ho is supposed to have made oloar his own porsonal displeasuro OVOR thg association with the former Communist party horo. Ta There is probably more danger in the prest situation of disorders ir Cortés should we go to obtain majority of the rotos, sinoo the Calderon Quand1460208 would undeniably be reluctant, for the reasons suggested above, to turn over the power to their bitter onomies In addition to the personal factors involved is the on oireunstance that in the present oun palen Cortes, has dofinitely taken a conservative position on jonos such as the labor code, social legislation, et cotor. Janual More and spokesman of the Vanguardia Populer party hayo ropoatedly insisted that they will not tolerate and send onttin dom of the social gains nade during the Calderón Guardia administration, chief of which, the Labor Codo and the Social Guarantees, wor. onarted in 1943.
Cortés has long been mowa as rabidly anti communist and not ospecially sympathetio to labors objectivos, hone, the prospoot of his taking over the prosiloney might well provoke physical resistance on the part of the well or canized Vanguardia party.
As stated above, the charge most frequently used against Cortés in this carpaign is that he has last uppathies. As the saying goes horo, not all Cortosistes are Nazis but all (Costa Rican) Nazis aro Cortonistas, cho last statement is substantially true, since the leading families hore of German extraction, such as the Mohamsos, Petors; Soeters, o. cetera, are faration support Certós. Sforts of the Calderón Cuardia administra deport onay alions and to take over properties of omeny.
allons have been handicapped by obstruetionist and dolaring tacties on the part of prominent Cortés supporters.
Cortos himself had oriticised certain of these Boare: suoh as deportation of cortaia onomy alions and commonly.
The Commons hore hare foportedly been ondeavor ing to stero off expropriation proceedings until May 1944 in the hope that cortos will win.
The present campaign has been uique in Costa Rica political history for many reasons. Campaigns hore u traditionall, hard fought and characterized by violons popsonal invoetive and in that TOspect the romant fleht bottom