remained the possibility that Somoza would come anyway, counting on some hotheads in Calderon party to rebel against his authority and join the Nicaraguans but het thought that improbable as steps were being taken to guard against such a possibility. That seems to confirm reports received earlier that Vanguardia partisans are already disarming Calderonistas in the city. He thought also that the airport danger could be averted as he had reason to.
believe that Colonel Julio Lopez Ma segoza would follow the rest of the officers still nominally loyal to the President. He said that the pending agreement with Figueres involves the disarming of his partisans and their return to work, with guarantees he considers adequate. He said plans were well advanced for the transfer of power step by step. Once the agreement is signed the President will appoint a new Minister of War acceptable to both parties. Then he will gradually replace the officers in charge of the Cuarteles so as to place them in the hands of loyal officers only then could the President announce his resignation, Hild presence of Nicaraguan troops in Costa Rica, the stated on his word of honor that he knew of none such at this moment. There are and have been Nicaraguan officers in an advisory capacity. He would investigate thoroughly but thought we had been misled by seeing some of the government troops from the Pacific area.
They are dark skinned like Nicaraguans (as some of them are by birth. body of these men better dressed and armed than the mariachis we see around here were recently brought from the coast for the defense of San José but he did not know of the presence of any personnel of the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional. He then asked if our governments would recognize the proposed new government of Costa Rica if it should maintain itself in power beyond May after calling a constituent assembly to revise the constitution and call new elections, explaining the practical impossibility of organizing the new congress. We said we could not answer off the cuff, but were sure our governments would want to support Costa Rica if the new government maintains order, restores peace, and proceeds within constitutional bounds.
After Mora left. we drafted an identical cable to be sent by each of us to our respective governments and delegations at Bogotá, coming from us as members of the Commission and without support of our other American colleagues, reporting on the danger of a Nicaraguan invasion and alerting them that if a final agreement between the government, supported by Vanguardia at least if not by Calderon on the one hand and Figueres on the other, is not reached at tomorrow meeting, we would suggest that they put the machinery of mutual consultation in motion and take advantage of the presence of a Nicaraguan delegation at Bogotá to bring united pressure.
While was