18intentions to these countries in a manner caloulated to assuage their usual misgivings as to our ultimate intentions with respect to thom. o) This would appear to be the psychological moment to send a Confidential Agent or Special Envoy to sound Honduras for the reason that the Trading with the Enemy Act has forced 08 to take some definito ao tion with respect to the elimination of enemy influence from the port of Amapala. The building of a new port has even been considered and if the engineers report indicates that this is feasible our country might do the work, or pay for it, as one form of compensation for the granting of the proposed naval base rights. 1) The President of Salvador has told me repeatedly that he could not go back on his protests against the Nicaraguan Canal Convention, but that if Honduras should negotiate a treaty with us granting rights in Fonseca Bay similar to those extended in the Nicaraguan Canal Convention he might modify his attitude under the argument that two of the three countries interested had taken positions with which he did not agree but that he would respect the decision of the majority and enter into similar arrangements so that no act of his might appear to place his country in a position likely to be interpreted as opposed to Central American unity. Note should be taken of the fact that the above assurances were given to me prior to the decision of the Central American Court of Justice, in the case of Salvador versus Nicaragua.
While President Melendez has repeatedly assured me that he favored the re union of Central America it would be well to remember that after December first, 1918, the eve of Presidential elections, no action could be expected from him. 4)
Communications. We may not favor the re union of Central American states at the present, but in anys event we cannot deny that